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Abstract
Using choice modeling, we explore willingness to pay for rhino horn among
existing and potential future consumers in Vietnam. We find that wild-sourced
horn, harvested humanely from the least rare species, is the most highly val-
ued product. Furthermore, consumers are willing to pay less for rhino horn
products under a scenario where international trade is legalized compared to
the current situation of illegal trade. We discuss the potential implications of
our findings on rhino poaching and international trade policy.
Introduction
Poaching remains a critical threat to the survival of many
species worldwide, including tiger and rhino (Milliken
& Shaw 2012; Saif et al. 2016). The global conservation
community, working through international bodies such
as CITES, is committing significant resources to the fight
against poaching as well as demand reduction measures
(CoP16; Decision 16.85, 2013). However, serious ques-
tion marks remain concerning the effectiveness of cur-
rent approaches and policies, as poaching rates and de-
mand for animal parts, especially those used in traditional
Asian medicine, remain stubbornly high (Challender &
MacMillan 2014; Olmedo et al. 2017).
Crucial aspects of the demand and supply for wildlife
parts used in traditional medicine (TM) remain poorly
understood (Collins et al. 2013). In this article, we explore
demand for rhino horn in Vietnam deploying a choice ex-
periment (CE) to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for
rhino horn with different attributes. In traditional Asian
medicine, rhino horn is prescribed for a variety of ail-
ments and conditions including fever and alcohol poison-
ing, and is greatly valued as a gift in family and business
circles in Vietnamese society (Biggs et al. 2013). Our sam-
ple was drawn from 857 Vietnamese citizens who have
purchased or who expressed an interest in purchasing
rhino horn for medicinal use, and is the largest survey
conducted to date with these consumer groups.
The CE method has been used to investigate consumer
demand for illegally hunted wildlife products, in the con-
text of rural households in Tanzania for reducing con-
sumption of bushmeat (Moro et al. 2015); to estimate the
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Table 1 Attributes and levels used in the CE design
Attribute Levels and description
Source 3 levels (farmed, semiwild, orwild)
Rarity of rhino species 3 levels (very rare, rare, and not rare): very rare
– less than 100 of these species in the wild;
rare – less than 5,000 animals of these
species left in the wild; not rare – more than
10,000 animals of this species left in the wild
Harvesting method 2 levels (lethal and nonlethal)
Price ($US per 100 g) 8 levels (1,200; 2,400; 3,600; 4,800; 6,000;
7,200; 8,400; 9,600)
willingness of illegal bushmeat hunters in Tanzania to re-
duce time spent hunting (Moro et al. 2013), in the de-
mand for bushmeat in Vietnam (Shairp et al. 2016); and
the demand for bear bile (Dutton et al. 2011). CEs are
particularly well-suited to investigate the demand for il-
legally obtained wildlife products as data on actual con-
sumption preferences is hard to acquire because of their
illegal nature and presenting hypothetical choices avoids
the need to interrogate about actual use.
Methods
CEs are now applied extensively in environmental pol-
icy contexts (Johnston et al. 2017). The method assumes
that choices about a good such as rhino horn can be de-
scribed using a set of product attributes such as prove-
nance and cost, as well as attributes that describe the
individual making these choices. It is also assumed that
individuals are willing to trade off having more of one de-
sirable attribute against less of another desirable attribute;
and to trade off all product attributes against the price
of that product. The attributes and levels, once selected
typically using focus groups of the target population, are
combined into choice sets using experimental design pro-
cedures (Rose & Bliemer 2009). Each individual in the
survey responds to a sequence of choices and then statis-
tical modeling is used to infer the preferences for each at-
tribute: importantly, these preferences can be expressed
in terms of WTP using the parameter estimates for the
cost attribute.
Our experimental design was based upon four at-
tributes of rhino horn products and their associated levels
(Table 1). The attributes describe three sources of rhino
horn; whether rhinos are killed or not to obtain the horn;
the rarity of the rhino species from which the horn is
obtained; and the price to consumers in Vietnam. This
design was identified following interviews with 18 TM
practitioners in Vietnam and validated with 48 pilot in-
terviews. The price range used was based on information
acquired during a field visit to Vietnam, during which
contemporary price range information was collected from
local experts and TM specialists and compared to prices
quoted in the academic literature and local press. Price
levels used in the experimental design were then final-
ized following the pilot study.
In the main survey, each respondent was presented
with eight choice sets involving three choices (Product
A, Product B, or neither) as shown in Figure 1. Sam-
pling was targeted at current and potential rhino horn
users, identified from the following question: “Is it possi-
ble that you may purchase rhino horn in the future?” Re-
spondents could choose from five possible responses: def-
initely yes; probably yes; don’t know; probably no, and
definitely no. Those in the last category were not invited
to continue to the CE section of the survey.
Respondents were equally divided into two treatments
in order to explore the possible impact of legalizing trade,
with every second respondent asked to consider a sce-
nario where a regulated legal trade in rhino horn was al-
lowed, while the other half made choices under the sta-
tus quo of continuing illegal trade. Although they were
given the option to opt out of the CE if they did not ac-
cept it/believe it, none of the interviewees rejected their
assigned scenario. The CE was preceded by four sections:
Section 1 covered general use of TMs; Section 2 explored
use of rhino/pangolin TM use; Section 3 asked about pur-
chase of rhino horn/pangolin TM. A final section covered
questions about responses to various possible demand re-
duction interventions, and socioeconomic questions. The
full survey involved face-to-face interviews during 2016
with Vietnamese citizens, and was conducted by a local
company in the Vietnamese language.
Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, intervie-
wees were recruited via 18 experts in traditional Asian
medicine who acted as key informants, with subsequent
interviewees identified using the snowball sampling tech-
nique (Vogt 1999; Newing et al. 2011). Hence, our sam-
ple was not a random draw from the (unknown) popula-
tion of current purchasers of illegally sourced rhino horn
products since this was not feasible, given the small per-
centage to rhino horn users and the sensitive nature of
the survey.
Results
A total of 857 respondents completed the CE compo-
nent. Excluding those respondents who always selected
the “Neither A nor B” option, the sample contained 5,120
choice observations, of which Option A was selected in
38% of cases, Option B in 44%, and “Neither A nor B”
in 18% of responses. As Table 2 shows, the full sample
consists of predominantly young adults, as over half of
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Aribute Choice A Choice B Neither 
A or B
Source
Semi-Wild Wild
Rare? Rare Very Rare
Harvesng 
method
Non-Lethal Lethal
Price per 100 
grams
9,600 USD 2,400 USD
Figure 1 Example of choice card used in the
experiment.
all respondents were under the age of 29 (56%), with
72% under the age of 39. The modal age category is 18–
28 and the mean within the 29–38 age category. This is
similar to the Vietnamese population as a whole, where
the mean is 30 years (Statistics Vietnam 2016). About
half of the respondents (47%) have a university degree,
with a further 8% qualified at postgraduate level. Per-
sonal income ranged from less than 3 million to over
20 million VND per year. Mean income across the whole
sample was estimated at between VND 5–10 million,
Table 2 Sociodemographic characteristics of the sample
Characteristics Sample
Illegal trade scenario
subsample
Legal trade scenario
subsample Population
Number of respondents 857 440 417
Female share 0.61 0.59 0.62 0.50
Age (years):
Modal (range) 18–28 18–28 18–28
Mean (range) 29–38 29–38 29–38 30.4
Share of respondents with a university degree 0.47 0.52 0.43
Income (million VND):
Mean (range) 5–10 5–10 5–10 2.64
Median (range) 3–5 3–5 3–5
Shares of respondents with respect of using TM:
Those who used animal-based TM 0.84 0.83 0.85
Those who used or purchased rhino horn-based TM 0.28 0.26 0.31
Those who purchased rhino horn-based TM 0.18 0.15 0.21
Those who highly probably will buy rhino horn-based TM 0.51 0.48 0.53
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which is much higher than the average income for Viet-
nam (VND 2.64 million), but in line with Hanoi and
Ho Chi Minh cities where most of the interviews were
conducted (VND 6.7 million and VND 9.6 million). Ac-
cording to their statements, 719 (84%) respondents had
used animal-containing TM, including 244 (28%) who
had either used or purchased TM that contained rhino
horn. Moreover, 433 (51%) said that it was highly proba-
ble that they would buy rhino horn-containing TM in the
future. According to results of the Pearson’s chi-square
test for equality of proportions, the legal/illegal trade sub-
samples appear to be broadly similar, with only signifi-
cant differences in the two groups for the percentage with
a university degree (0.52 vs. 0.43, P = 0.007) and the
percentage who had previously purchased rhino horn-
based TM (0.15 vs. 0.21, P = 0.048). Although there
was a higher overall percentage of females in our sample
(61%), males formed the majority of users of TM con-
taining rhino horn (54%).
We estimated several discrete choice models, including
random parameters logit (RPL) and latent class random
parameters (LCRP), with or without interactions with so-
ciodemographic variables (Table 3). In the RPL model, re-
spondents are modeled as having a mean preference for
each attribute with an estimated standard deviation rep-
resenting the variation in tastes across the sample. In the
latent class model, individuals can be grouped into latent
classes. Within each latent class, people have more sim-
ilar preferences than they do with people who are more
likely to belong to other latent classes. This latent class
structure is combined with the random parameters idea
in the LCRP model.
In the best fit RPL model (judged on the AIC/n crite-
rion), with dummy variables corresponding to attribute
levels, we find that the variability of attribute coefficient
mean values is significantly explained by demographic
variables (gender, age, education, and income); being a
current buyer of TM with rhino horn; and the purchase
scenario (legal/illegal trade). The rhino horn attributes
that are significant for explaining choices are price (with
demand declining with increases in price); rhino horn
source, with respondents having a positive preference for
wild rhino compared to farmed rhino; and rarity, with
consumers on average preferring “nonrare” species over
“very rare.”
In the LCRP model, demographic variables partly de-
termine latent class membership probabilities. For Class
1 members, who constitute about 33% of the sample
and are more likely to have lower incomes, price is the
only important attribute. Class 3 members, who tend
to be better educated, have higher incomes, and more
likely to have purchased rhino horn in the past (70%
of all rhino horn product buyers are in this class), pre-
fer horn from “rare” over “very rare” species, and prefer
nonlethal over lethal harvesting. They also prefer wild-
sourced horn over semiwild or farmed varieties. Across
all three latent classes, price was significant but compared
to the RPL model, we observe more variability in size
and significance of the mean attribute coefficients across
classes.
WTP for different combinations of the attributes1
under a legal or illegal trade scenario was estimated
from the preference parameters and the price parameter
(Table 3) from the RPL model, are reported in Table 4.
These product type values represent the overall average
values of survey respondents, after taking into account
the variables that statistically influenced choices. We ob-
serve similar variation for different rhino horn “product
types” under both legal and illegal trade scenarios. Prod-
uct types 1 and 2 are equivalent to horn from poached
animals, and have a lower WTP than horn with the char-
acteristics of a supply from ranched (type 4) and farmed
(type 5) horn. Horn obtained from wild animals through
nonlethal harvesting (type 3) has the highest overall
WTP. Importantly, across all horn types, the most con-
sumers are willing to pay for legally traded horn is around
60–70% of their maximum WTP for an equivalent illegal
horn product. These tendencies are also clearly observ-
able in WTP calculations when only those respondents
who had previously purchased rhino horn products are
considered and the statistical significance of this result
was confirmed by a Swait-Louviere test on the two sub-
samples, which rejected the null hypothesis that the pref-
erence parameters for rhino horn product attributes in
the legal and illegal trade scenarios were equal.
Discussion
Our consumers tend to prefer wild horn over semiwild
or farmed products, which may reflect a more general
tendency in TM that associates wild-sourced products
with greater power and/or effectiveness (Gratwicke et al.
2008). However, the finding that our sample strongly
prefer horn acquired from nonlethal harvesting has not
been reported previously and suggests that horn sourced
humanely from living rhinos would attract a premium in
the market.
Although trade bans are known to increase prices
and stimulate clandestine hunting (Rivalan et al. 2007;
MacMillan & Han 2011), our study is the first to show
that legalization would reduce consumer WTP. This find-
ing gives credence to the notion that rare and illegal
wildlife products such as rhino horn and pangolin may
be especially sought after by consumers because they are
illegal: both consumption and gift-giving can generate
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Table 3 Estimation results for RPL and LCRP models with attribute-level dummy variables and demographic variables
LCRP
RPL Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
ASC −4.950*** (1.470) 3.412*** (0.871) −4.473*** (0.349) 0.152 (0.286)
Semiwild 0.091 (0.143) −0.026 (1.004) −0.016 (0.087) −0.410* (0.211)
Farmed −0.303*** (0.111) −0.166 (0.806) −0.048 (0.120) −0.702*** (0.204)
Rare −0.120 (0.083) 0.868 (0.656) −0.277** (0.122) 0.721*** (0.233)
Not rare 0.109* (0.059) 0.113 (0.856) 0.009 (0.078) 0.228 (0.185)
Nonlethal 0.120 (0.462) 0.597 (0.173) 0.096 (0.123) 1.203*** (0.209)
Price (in $US 1,000 ) −0.099*** (0.017) −0.678*** (0.173) −0.041*** (0.016) −0.169*** (0.032)
ASC × legal 0.160 (0.607) −1.176 (0.848) −1.182*** (0.351) 0.127 (0.373)
ASC × buyer −0.227 (0.798) −2.347*** (0.700) 4.544*** (0.462) −6.596*** (0.842)
ASC × income −0.213*** (0.042)
ASC × education 0.850*** (0.266)
Semiwild × legal −0.141 (0.121) −0.816 (0.937) −0.208* (0.124) −0.231 (0.279)
Semiwild × buyer 0.337** (0.155) −0.224 (0.729) 0.664*** (0.174) −0.990* (0.512)
Semiwild × age −0.010** (0.004)
Farmed × Legal −0.446*** (0.155) −1.225 (0.767) −0.541*** (0.166) −0.053 (0.264)
Farmed × buyer −0.320 (0.226) −0.121 (0.671) 0.590*** (0.213) −1.435*** (0.433)
Rare × legal −0.018 (0.169) −0.619 (0.673) 0.559*** (0.181) −0.750** (0.321)
Rare × buyer −0.204 (0.252) −0.122 (0.577) −0.077 (0.244) −1.184** (0.554)
Not rare × legal 0.034 (0.104) 1.453* (0.845) 0.025 (0.109) −0.096 (0.239)
Not rare × buyer −0.458*** (0.124) −0.530 (0.671) 0.057 (0.146) −1.977*** (0.355)
Nonlethal × legal 0.402 (0.218) 0.813 (0.616) −0.186 (0.182) −0.187 (0.285)
Nonlethal × buyer 0.748*** (0.283) −1.472*** (0.557) 1.942*** (0.263) −2.534*** (0.542)
Nonlethal × income −0.043** (0.020)
Nonlethal × education 0.145* (0.084)
Price × legal −0.081*** (0.022) 0.100 (0.164) −0.118*** (0.024) 0.060 (0.042)
Price × BUYER −0.070** (0.028) 0.245** (0.123) 0.015 (0.037) −0.121** (0.053)
SD (SQ const.) 7.159*** (0.442) 0.0004 (0.098) 0.0004 (0.115) 0.0005 (0.067)
SD (Semiwild) 0.391*** (0.131) 0.0015 (0.227) 0.0005 (0 .051) 0.0003 (0.104)
SD (Farmed) 0.863*** (0.159) 0.0002 (0.188) 0.0002 (0.069) 0.0021 (0.096)
SD (Nonlethal) 1.845*** (0.145) 0.0002 (0.117) 0.0009 (0.068) 0.0004 (0.077)
SD (Price) 0.152*** (0.017) 0.0012 (0.027) 0.0001 (0.007) 0.0002 (0.011)
Pr(class) 0.327 0.496 0.178
Pr(class) × female −0.094 (0.261) −0.421* (0.246)
Pr(class) × age −0.014 (0.009) −0.020** (0.009)
Pr(class) × income −0.053** (0.026) 0.004 (0.024)
Pr(class) × education −0.379*** (0.130) −0.483*** (0.126)
Nr of observations 5120 5120
Pseudo R2 0.3759 0.3800
LogLik −4,700.6568 −4,669.7466
AIC/n 1.378 1.390
Notes: 1. The baseline attribute levels are wild, very rare, and lethal, and dummies for these are not included in the model.
2. Standard errors of the estimates are provided in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
social esteem and status in Vietnamese society (Shairp
et al. 2016). We note that drug enforcement efforts have
had similar difficulty confronting the consumption of
other banned substances such as cocaine (Chand & Cali-
fano 2007).
Our results relate solely to a legalized but regulated
market. If both legal and illegal markets were to persist
after trade was legalized, then the incentives for illegal
hunting would depend on the relative price in legal and
illegal markets. While there is a possibility that legally
sourced rhino horn may encourage a significant number
of Vietnamese consumers to purchase rhino horn for the
first time, especially if incomes continue to rise rapidly,
our results offer initial evidence that the provision of
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an alternative legal supply humane harvesting from live
animals may significantly displace poaching activity. As
has been the case with crocodilians (MacGregor 2006;
Moyle 2013), the introduction of a legal trade would de-
press prices for illegal supplies because: (1) any price pre-
mium due to its illegal nature (allure factor) would be di-
minished; (2) consumers prefer horn obtained humanely
from live animals; and (3) the introduction of significant
substitute supplies of legally sourced horn would in it-
self depress prices. However, we should note that any
displacement effect will also depend on supply-side re-
sponses and the effectiveness of enforcement measures
and any system of certification that is introduced (Biggs
et al. 2013). We are also unsure about whether the pref-
erences of rhino horn products in Vietnam are repre-
sentative of the preferences of rhino horn consumers in
other countries such as China. Further research is there-
fore required to explore the full economics of rhino horn
production under a legalized trade scenario to establish
whether a residual market in illegally hunted rhino horn
products would remain, and at what scale.
The global community has focused on two measures
to counter rhino horn illegal trade and to curb poaching:
supply-side trade restrictions (e.g., antipoaching mea-
sures, import seizures, etc.) and demand reduction. We
investigated, through additional questions in our survey,
possible responses to three alternative approaches to
reduce demand: the release of government-backed
media campaigns; doubling existing financial penalties
for purchasing rhino horn; and the risk of incurring a
6-month prison sentence. We also investigated this
through in-depth interviews with 18 rhino horn sup-
pliers, including representatives of traditional hospitals,
private pharmacies, and individuals who sell rhino horn.
In our responses only 3% of rhino horn TM users sur-
veyed declared that they consumed less because of media
campaign, and this low response rate was confirmed by
the specialists’ interviewed. In Vietnam, several organi-
zations have already conducted information campaigns
to inform citizens of rhino horn’s lack of medicinal value.
However, the majority of our respondents reported that
stronger penalties such as imprisonment or heavy fines
for purchasing rhino horn would be more of a deterrent
than information campaigns alone. This result supports
the conclusions of recent research highlighting the need
for law enforcements to complement campaigns (Olmedo
et al. 2017).
Although our study represents the only major study of
rhino horn demand that interviews rhino horn users di-
rectly, it is important to stress that our sample was not
a random draw from the (unknown) population of users
and purchasers of illegally sourced rhino horn products,
since that population is unidentified, and may therefore
not be representative of the wider population of buyers.
Moreover, we may not have adequately sampled people
who do not currently purchase and/or buy rhino horn
products, but who would if trade was legalized. Both of
these sampling biases would need to be taken into ac-
count in any attempt to aggregate up demand effects.
As with all surveys of illegal goods there is always the
possibility that some respondents may not have answered
truthfully. However, the motivation for hiding consump-
tion from the interviewer is perhaps lower than in other
contexts, because there is little or no social stigma at-
tached to consumption of TM products in Vietnam as
consumers often have little to fear from laws to protect
wildlife (Shairp et al. 2016). However, in addition to nor-
mal measures to encourage honest responses (e.g., confi-
dential and anonymous interview guarantees), we asked
a number of questions for cross-checking purposes. Fur-
thermore, the use of the snowball sampling technique
helps generate additional trust between the interviewer
and interviewee as the latter has been recruited by a
trusted associate or acquaintance (Newing et al. 2011).
We cannot exclude the possibility that some respon-
dents behaved strategically for other reasons. For exam-
ple, current buyers might want to signal a desire for lower
prices in the case of the legal provision scenario (Carson
and Groves 2007); or might overstate their WTP in order
to impress the interviewer. For example, in Table 4, WTP
estimates for current rhino horn buyers are significantly
lower than the calculations for the pooled sample and it
may be that current buyers considered affordability more
closely than nonbuyers. We are not able to explicitly test
for other possible strategic behaviours in the choice data.
Given the uncertainty about the future success of de-
mand reduction campaigns and other enforcement ef-
forts in Asia (Challender & MacMillan 2014), where con-
sumption is shaped by a complex array of factors such
as personal preferences, family and community tradition,
and business culture (Lee 1998), we suggest that the in-
ternational community should be open at least to ex-
ploring some of the issues raised by our research. Legal-
ized, regulated trade could re-establish interest in a sus-
tainable wildlife management models that generate sig-
nificant revenues to poor rural communities in Africa.
This would help to offset the costs of conserving rhi-
nos and other species in the wild, including the costs of
reducing poaching and the opportunity costs of species
conservation to local people (Cooney et al. 2015; Di
Minin et al. 2015).
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Endnote
1. WTP for a particular product is measured relative to the
“no purchase” option and it is calculated as a sum of the
relevant marginal utilities corresponding to the model’s
coefficients (after accounting for all interactions).
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